Tuesday, October 30, 2012

Tax Court Finds Items used for Estimate Preparations, Machinery Reassembly and Lawn Care Were Not Entitled to Public Transportation Exemption for Equipment Moving Company



The parties agree about how Wendt uses the property at issue, and they agree that Wendt is generally in the business of providing public transportation.  (See Oral Argument Tr. at 4-5, 25-26.)  The essence of the parties’ dispute focuses on the proper way to determine whether Wendt’s purchases of tangible personal property are entitled to the public transportation exemption.  Wendt claims the property at issue is entitled to exemption because it is predominantly used or consumed within its integrated public transportation process, while the Department counters that none of the property at issue is exempt because it is not directly used to furnish public transportation.

Wendt claims that nearly all of its purchases of tangible personal property at issue  are  exempt  because it uses or consumes the property to provide public transportation in its unique, integrated public transportation process.  (See Pet’r Br. at 21-22 (footnote added).)   Wendt describes  its integrated process  as  encompassing a bundle of services made up of several integrated, indivisible, and continuous steps that are all necessary or immediately linked to its provision of public transportation.  (See Oral Argument Tr. at 6, 23; Pet’r Reply Br. at 1-2; Pet’r Br. at 18-20.)  Wendt contends that each phase of its integrated process, beginning at the moment a customer calls for an estimate and  ending with the  reassembly of the machinery at the destination, involves the provision of public transportation.  (See Oral Argument Tr. at 4-11.)

The Department responds, however, that Wendt’s services are provided not as an integrated public transportation process, but as nothing more than a unique, all-in one business model that offers a menu of à la carte services, some that are public transportation and some that are not.  (See Oral Argument Tr. at 32-38, 41-42; Resp’t Br. at 5-6 (footnote added).)    Explaining, the Department states that Wendt’s competitors provide many of the same services on a stand-alone basis, but the property used to provide those individual services  is ineligible for exemption; thus,  Wendt’s similar services must be ineligible. (See Oral Argument Tr. at 23, 32, 36-41; Resp’t Br. at 3, 5 (footnote added).)  The Department concludes that given individual scrutiny, not evaluation based on the relationship to Wendt’s core activity of transporting machinery on the highways, the property at issue is not exempt because it is not “directly used or consumed in providing public transportation.”    (See Oral Argument Tr. at 23, 36-39
(footnote added)); see also I.C. § 6-2.5-5-27.

Direct Use

As discussed above, Wendt’s property will qualify for exemption if the evidence shows that it is “necessary and integral” to Wendt’s provision of public  transportation services.  See USAir, 542 N.E.2d at 1036.  Moreover, the exemption extends to items directly used in a continuous, integrated public transportation process.  See Harbor Belt, 460 N.E.2d at 175.  Accordingly, the critical question here is whether Wendt’s property is necessary and integral to Wendt’s integrated public transportation process.

Phase 1:  Project Planning

As  detailed in the facts above, Wendt claims its  public  transportation process begins when it prepares estimates for potential customers.   Wendt’s  estimates are better characterized as sales activity, however, because they are intended  to present the lowest bid and obtain a customer.  (See Resp’t Des’g Evid. Vol. 2, Ex. 20 at 27-28.)  Thus, while Wendt’s  estimates  may be connected to  its provision of public transportation, they do not always garner a customer and therefore are not necessary and integral to furnishing public transportation.  Moreover, this conclusion is consistent with those portions of the public transportation regulations that deem property used for sales and  other non-operational activities, such as cost projections, ineligible for exemption.  See 45 IND. ADMIN. CODE 2.2-5-61(e), (m) (2001); see also 45 IND. ADMIN.CODE 2.2-5-62 (f), (k) (2001).  Accordingly, the Court finds that preparing estimates is not part of Wendt’s public transportation process and, therefore, property used in providing these services is not necessary and integral to Wendt’s integrated public transportation process. 

In this phase, Wendt also plans transportation routes and obtains travel permits.  Both are necessary and integral to  Wendt’s public transportation process because Wendt could not legally haul oversized machinery over the highways without travel permits for the route being traveled.  Moreover, the public transportation regulations deem a common carrier’s purchases  of  items  to comply with federal and state mandates, as reasonably necessary to the rendering of public transportation.  See 45 I.A.C. 2.2-5-61(d); see also 45 I.A.C. 2.2-5-62(e).  Therefore, property used to plan the routes and obtain the travel permits is necessary and integral to Wendt’s integrated public transportation process.

Phase 2:  Pre-transportation Preparations

  As stated  in the facts  above, Wendt’s  pre-transportation preparations involve the disassembly, loading, and securing of oversized machinery onto the flatbed trucks for transport.  Disassembly and loading are necessary and integral to Wendt’s public transportation process because without disassembly, the machinery would be too heavy for loading and too  large  for legal road transport.  As just mentioned,  a common carrier’s  activities  to comply with legal requirements are necessary and integral to furnishing  public transportation.   See 45 I.A.C. 2.2-5-61(d);  see also 45 I.A.C. 2.2-5-62(e); USAir,  582 N.E.2d at 778 (explaining that the public transportation  exemption extends to items that are legally required for continued operations).  Furthermore, although pre-transportation activities generally are excluded from the definition of public transportation, property used for the “loading and unloading of persons or property into or from transportation vehicles” is expressly included within the scope of public transportation.  See 45 I.A.C. 2.2-5-61(f), (j); see also 45 I.A.C. 2.2-5-62(g).  Thus, the Court finds that Wendt’s property used to disassemble, load, and secure its customer’s machinery for subsequent movement over the highways is necessary and integral to Wendt’s public transportation process. 

Phase 3:  Transportation

  This phase involves  the seminal activities of Wendt’s public transportation process. Wendt hauls its customers’ machinery on the highways,  provides escort services, and unloads the machinery at the customer’s destination.  Hauling oversizedmachinery over the state and federal  highways is necessary and integral to Wendt’s public transportation process because it embodies the very essence of public transportation:  the movement of another’s property for consideration.  See 45 I.A.C. 2.2-5-61(b), (f); 45 I.A.C. 2.2-5-62(c), (g).  Escort services are required by federal and state law and thus are necessary and integral to the provision of public transportation.  See, e.g., http:www.in.gov/dor/files/m204.pdf (detailing Indiana’s escort vehicle requirements).  In addition, unloading property from transportation vehicles is expressly included within the scope of public transportation.   See 45 I.A.C. 2.2-5-61(f), (j);  see also 45 I.A.C. 2.2-5-62(g).  Accordingly, the Court finds that Wendt’s property used to transport, escort, and secure its customers’ machinery  is  necessary and integral to Wendt’s public transportation process. 

Phase 4:  Reassembly

As described in the facts above, Wendt reassembles  the oversized machinery inside the customer’s new factory location.  Wendt performs its reassembly services post-delivery, and  reassembly services have no apparent link to any federal or state mandates.   Accordingly,  Wendt’s  reassembly  services are a convenience for  its customers that are incidental to its provision of public transportation and, thus, they fall outside the ambit of public transportation.  See USAir, 582 at 779 (affirming the denial of exemption on certain food items that were “incidental” to the taxpayer’s transportation service).   Moreover, this finding is  also  consistent with the  public transportation regulations that  do not include  post-transportation activities in the definition of public transportation.  See 45 I.A.C. 2.2-5-61(f); 45 I.A.C. 2.2-5-62(g). 

Optional Services

During the years at issue, Wendt  also provided warehouse storage  exclusively for the temporary storage of its customers’ in-transit property.  (See Resp’t Des’g Evid. Vol. 2, Ex. 20 at 82-85.)  “[T]emporary storage is considered to be an integral part of rendering public transportation.”  45 I.A.C. 2.2-5-61(g).  Therefore, all tangible personal property used to provide warehouse storage services falls within  the  scope of public transportation. 

Wendt also transported its customers’ machinery to third party locations for repair services.  (See Trial Tr. at 59-61.)  When a common carrier moves another’s property over the highways for consideration, it is providing public transportation.  45 I.A.C. 2.2-5-61(b); 45 I.A.C. 2.2-5-62(c).  Therefore,  the property used to provide Wendt’s transport-for-repair services also falls within the scope of public transportation. 
In this case, the evidence shows that Wendt’s services are generally provided as a continuous, integrated process of transporting its customers’ oversized equipment on the highways.  Wendt’s process is integrated because each phase of Wendt’s business is interrelated and dependent upon the others.  For instance, without disassembling the machinery, it would be too large for road transport; without escorts accompanying the oversized loads along the highway, the equipment could not lawfully travel the roads; without using ties to secure the equipment to the trucks, efficient transportation could not be accomplished.  Moreover, an argument that others could not qualify for exemption by providing one  of Wendt’s component services on a stand-alone basis does not persuade the Court to disqualify individual elements of an integrated public transportation process from eligibility for exemption.

Predominant Use

Having decided what property Wendt uses for exempt and non-exempt purposes, the Court  now  considers  whether Wendt has shown that it  predominately  used  the tangible personal property at issue in providing public transportation.   The Court has acknowledged that there are many ways to show that items are predominantly used in an exempt manner. See Indiana Waste Systems Ind., Inc. v. Indiana Dep’t of State Revenue, 644 N.E.2d 960, 961-62 (Ind. Tax Ct. 1994).  For example, predominate use may be shown by providing credible testimony,  providing the ratio of income derived from the property’s exempt use to the income derived from its non-exempt use, providing the ratio of the time spent using the property in an exempt manner to the time it is used in a non-exempt manner,  or providing a similar ratio calculation based on volume.  See id.; Calcar Quarries, 394 N.E.2d at 941. 

Here, the evidence at trial established how Wendt used its property with respect to its public transportation process and optional services.  (See, e.g., Resp’t Des’g Evid. Vol. 2, Ex.  20 at 10-89; Ex. 24  at  5-6, 10-12.)   Furthermore, the  uncontroverted testimony of Mr. Jere Wendt, one of Wendt’s founding partners, established that, during  the years at issue, 70 percent of  the jobs Wendt performed involved the provision of public transportation.   (See Trial Tr. at 39-40,  61-73.)    The Court not only  finds Mr. Wendt’s testimony to be credible, but also finds that his testimony is corroborated by the
Department’s audit findings.  The auditor’s block sample shows that nearly 70 percent of Wendt’s jobs involved the exclusive provision of public transportation.  Accordingly, the evidence before the Court leads to only one reasonable conclusion:  between the 2001 and 2004 tax years, Wendt predominately used its property in providing public transportation, and the Department erred in concluding otherwise.


For the above-stated reasons, the Court AFFIRMS the Department’s determination that items predominately used for estimate preparations, machinery reassembly, and lawn care were  not  entitled to  the public transportation.  All of the Department’s  remaining  determinations, however,  are  REVERSED.   Accordingly, the Court REMANDS the matter to the Department and ORDERS it to make the necessary
determinations in accordance with this opinion.

http://www.in.gov/judiciary/opinions/pdf/10301201mbw.pdf