Kildsig first claims that the
Indiana Board’s determination that Indiana Code § 6-1.1-15-1(p)’s
burden-shifting rule applied exclusively to the initial phases of the appeals
process (i.e., the PTABOA proceedings) is incorrect as a matter of law. (See
Oral Arg. Tr. at 5-7, 13-14; Pet’r Reply Br. at 1-3; Pet’r Br. at 1-6.) A final
determination of the Indiana
Board is contrary to law if it violates a statute or rule of substantive or
procedural law. Shelbyville MHPI, LLC v. Thurston, 978 N.E.2d 527, 529 (Ind.
Tax Ct. 2012).
Recently, the
Court found that the burden-shifting rule contained in Indiana Code §
6-1.1-15-1(p), as clarified by Indiana Code § 6-1.1-15-17, applied throughout
the entire appeals process, not just in the initial proceedings. See Orange Cnty.
Assessor v. Stout, No. 49T10-1112-TA-94, slip op. at 3-7 (Ind. Tax Ct. Oct. 2,
2013). Consequently, the Indiana Board’s conclusion that the burden-shifting
rule did not apply to its proceedings is contrary to law.
Kildsig also
claimed that the Indiana Board’s determination that 11.648 acres of his land
was “excess residential acreage” is not supported by substantial evidence. (See
Pet’r Reply Br. at 3-4; Pet’r Br. at 7.) During the Indiana Board hearing,
Kildsig argued that his Woods Management Plan showed that he used his land for
an agricultural purpose. (See Cert. Admin. R. at 114, 199-200, 205-06.) Kildsig
further testified that his removal of timber from this land to heat his
residence showed that he used it for an agricultural purpose. (See Cert. Admin.
R. at 202.) Finally, Kildsig contended that his land classification as excess
residential acreage was improper because an adjacent, similarly wooded parcel
was classified as agricultural land.
In contrast,
the Assessor explained that although Kildsig had a Woods Management Plan,
indicating that he intended to improve the timber production on the land to
provide firewood, his plan was executed in 2010 and was not in effect during
the 2009 tax year. (See Cert. Admin. R. at 99-101, 218, 231.) The Assessor also
claimed that because Kildsig hunted in the wooded acreage and used its timber
to heat his home, he used the land for recreational and residential purposes,
not an agricultural purpose. (See Cert. Admin. R. at 201-02, 223-25.)
Furthermore, the Assessor claimed that the classification of the adjacent,
wooded parcel was not indicative of the proper classification of Kildsig’s land
because the adjacent timberland was part of a much larger income-producing
farm. (See Cert. Admin. R. at 211-13,
227-28 (footnote added).) See also REAL PROPERTY ASSESSMENT
GUIDELINES FOR 2002—VERSION A (2004 Reprint) (incorporated by reference at 50 IND. ADMIN. CODE 2.3-1-2),
Bk. 1, Ch. 2 at 99 (indicating that devoting land to an agricultural use
involves, among other things, the cultivation of income-producing crops).
Finally, the Assessor explained that Kildsig’s wooded acreage had been
incorrectly classified as agricultural land for years, and that she had
purposefully delayed reclassifying his land as excess residential acreage in
order to change similarly misclassified land at the same time:
Basically, the
previous assessor for the tax year 2006, payable 2007, had switched this
particular property class from agricultural to residential. When I came into
office, Mr. Kildsig had filed an appeal, and based on my further investigation
of surrounding property owners, and neighbors in this area, I felt that he was
switched unfairly, I guess so to say. It is not that I didn’t feel that the
switch was correct. I did not feel that he was agricultural or deserving of
that classification on his property, but I did feel like there were other
surrounding property owners that should have also been switched and were [not]
done so at that time. So at that time I informed Mr. Kildsig that I would agree
to switch his property back to agricultural until we could trend the entire
area, and do a review of all properties and switch everyone that was necessary.
I told him that would be happening in the future.
(Cert. Admin.
R. at 214-15.)
A determination of the Indiana Board is supported by
substantial evidence “if a reasonable person could view the record in its
entirety and find enough relevant evidence to support the . . . determination.”
Amax, Inc. v. State Bd. of Tax Comm’rs, 552 N.E.2d 850, 852 (Ind. Tax Ct.
1990). Here, the Assessor’s evidence indicates that Kildsig did not use his land
for an agricultural purpose; Kildsig’s evidence indicates he did. The Indiana
Board found the Assessor’s evidentiary presentation more persuasive. Now, on
appeal, Kildsig invites this Court to do something that it cannot do - reweigh
the evidence. See Freudenberg-NOK Gen. P’ship v. State Bd. of Tax Comm’rs, 715
N.E.2d 1026, 1030 (Ind. Tax Ct. 1999), review denied (explaining that this
Court may not reweigh the evidence or judge the credibility of witnesses).
Indeed, this Court may not reverse a final determination of the Indiana Board
simply because it disagrees with how the Indiana Board found the facts, and it
may not substitute its judgment for that of the Indiana Board. See Alte Salems
Kirche, Inc. v. State Bd. of Tax Comm’rs, 694 N.E.2d 810, 813 (Ind. Tax Ct.
1998). Accordingly, the Court concludes that the Indiana Board’s determination
regarding the classification of a portion of Kildsig’s land is supported by
substantial evidence.
