The Petitioner presented an appraisal prepared by Anthony
Akins, a licensed Indiana appraiser. The appraiser concluded the property was
worth $211,000 as of June 20, 2011. Gentry testimony; Akins Appriasal.
The Akins Appraisal concluded that the market value of the
subject property was $211,000 as of June 20, 2011. It also states that “home
values in the area appear to be declining based on sales in the township in the
past twelve months.” The Akins Appraisal does not indicate how much that
decline would have been between March 1, 2010, and June 20, 2011, but the
statement is a clear indication that value as of the required date would have
been more than $211,000. And the Petitioner failed to otherwise relate the
appraised value to a value as of March 1, 2010. Accordingly, the appraisal
fails to prove the Petitioner’s case.
The Petitioner also argued that his house is over-valued based
on the assessed values of comparable houses in the area. In order to
effectively use a comparison approach to value a property, the proponent must
establish actual comparability. Conclusory statements that a property is
“similar” or “comparable” to another property do not constitute probative
evidence of comparability. Long, 821 N.E.2d at 470. Instead,
comparability must be proved through the characteristics of the subject
property and the comparable. How are they the same? How are they different? The
Petitioner did not address these questions. Most importantly, one must explain
how any differences between the properties affect their relative market
values-in-use. See Id. at 470-71. The Petitioner failed to present the
facts and analysis that are essential for any conclusion about the value of the
subject property based on the purported comparables.
Merely comparing assessments was found to be insufficient to
show the Petitioner’s assessment needs to be corrected. Westfield Golf
Practice Center, LLC v. Washington Township Assessor, 859 N.E.2d 396 (Ind.
Tax Ct. 2007). It is not enough for a taxpayer to show that its property is
assessed for more than other comparable properties. Instead, the taxpayer must
present probative evidence to show that the property’s assessed value does not
accurately reflect market value-in-use. Id. The Petitioner presented no
relevant, probative evidence to show that his assessment did not reflect the
market value-in-use of his property.
The Petitioner touched on the issue of uniformity and
equality. He attached documents to his Form 131 petition that show differences
between assessed value and sale price of the Stuczynski and the Guhl
properties. This kind of approach could be significant: a taxpayer may
offer ratio studies that compare the assessed values of properties in an
assessing jurisdiction with objectively verifiable data, such as sales prices
or appraisals. Westfield Golf, 859 N.E.2d at 399 n. 3. But the studies
must be prepared according to professionally acceptable standards. See Kemp
v. State Bd. of Tax Comm’rs, 726 N.E.2d 395, 404 (Ind. Tax Ct. 2000). They
must be based on a statistically reliable sample. See Bishop v. State Bd. of
Tax Comm’rs, 743 N.E.2d 810, 813 (Ind. Tax Ct. 2001). “A study sample with
fewer than five (5) sales shall not be used due [to] its exceptionally poor
reliability.” 50 IAC 27-5-3(c). The Petitioner’s sample of two is not
sufficient. Furthermore, the Petitioner did not offer or explain these
attachments at the hearing. Accordingly, the Board gives the information about
the Stuczynski and Guhl properties no weight. See Indianapolis Racquet Club,
802 N.E.2d at 1022.
