The Petitioner’s representative agreed with the Respondent’s valuation of the improvements on the subject property. Smith testimony. Therefore the only values at issue in these appeals are the property’s land value for 2008, 2009 and 2011.
Pursuant to Indiana Code § 6-1.1-15-18(c), “To accurately determine market-value-in-use, a taxpayer or an assessing official may … introduce evidence of the assessments of comparable properties located in the same taxing district or within two (2) miles of a boundary of the taxing district…” Ind. Code § 6-1.1-15-18. The “determination of whether properties are comparable shall be made using generally accepted appraisal and assessment practices.” Id.
Here, the Respondent’s witness argues that the Petitioner’s land was correctly valued based on the assessed value and the sales prices of properties located in the neighboring area. Surface testimony; Respondent Exhibits D, E and J. In support of this contention, Mr. Surface submitted property record cards, photographs, sales disclosure forms, a land abstraction grid and a map. Respondent Exhibit A, D, E and F. Mr. Surface testified that land on properties in the Petitioner’s property’s neighborhood were assessed for $25 per square foot and a similarly situated corner lot was given a 100% influence factor for its location – like the subject property. Respondent Exhibit D. The Petitioner’s evidence likewise confirms that land in the Petitioner’s property’s neighborhood was almost universally assessed for $25 per square foot. The only exceptions were land used for rental properties, which by statute are assessed differently than other residential or commercial properties pursuant to Indiana Code § 6-1.1-4-39.4 While the Petitioner’s representative argued that several “corner” lots were not assessed with a 100% influence factor like the subject property, Mr. Surface testified that those lots were not “comparable” to the subject property because they were corner lots to an alley, a dead end street, or a one way street into a residential area that had little commercial development.
In addition, the Respondent’s witness argues, sales in the area of the Petitioner’s property support the assessed value of the land. According to Mr. Surface, the county used the “abstraction method” to determine the portion of the sales price that is attributed to the land value. Id. In the abstraction method the “value of the land is determined by subtracting the depreciated value of the improvements from the sales price. The result indicates the contribution of the land value to the total sale. REAL PROPERTY ASSESSMENT GUIDELINES – Version A, chap. 2 at 15. Thus, the abstraction method is a “generally accepted” assessment practice under Indiana Code § 6-1.1-15-18(c). According to Mr. Surface, sale prices ranged from $620,000 to $1,345,000, with the abstracted value of the land ranging from $62 per square foot to $231 per square foot. Surface testimony; Respondent Exhibit E. Moreover, the property identified as “H” on the Respondent’s map sold for $660,000 in 2006 and the purchaser tore down the building – which suggests the land alone was worth at least $660,000 or $125 per square foot. Surface testimony; Respondent Exhibits D and E.
Thus, the Board finds that based on the assessed value of land in the Petitioner’s neighborhood, supported by the abstracted value of land from sales in the area, the Respondent has provided some evidence to support the subject property’s 2008 assessed value under Indiana Code § 6-1.1-15-18(c). Once a party raises a prima facie case, the burden shifts to the opposing party to rebut or impeach the evidence. See American United Life Insurance Co. v. Maley, 803 N.E.2d 276 (Ind. Tax Ct. 2004).
Here, the Petitioner’s evidence supported a finding that the land value in the Petitioner’s property’s neighborhood was $25 per square foot for the assessment years at issue. However, the Petitioner’s representative contends the 100% positive influence factor applied to the Petitioner’s land should be removed to bring the Petitioner’s land assessed value in line with other properties in the geographical neighborhood. Smith testimony; Petitioner Exhibit 2. But as the Board found above, the Respondent’s witness sufficiently showed that another similarly situated corner lot received the same 100% influence factor for its location and that the properties that the Petitioner’s representative contends were “comparable” corner lots were not, in fact, comparable because they “cornered” on an alleyway or dead end street. While some of the Petitioner’s
representative’s comparable properties were calculated to have a land value below $25 per square foot, Mr. Smith failed to present any property record cards to show how the “comparable” properties were assessed. And while the Petitioner’s “summary sheet” purports to show the size of each parcel and each parcel’s assessed land value, there is no evidence what base rate was applied to each parcel or what adjustments were applied to that base rate for each property. Thus, the Board has no means of comparing the Petitioner’s land assessment to the land assessments on the other properties that Mr. Smith argues are comparable, sufficient to rebut the Respondent’s witness’ testimony that parcels in the Petitioner’s property’s neighborhood that were not assigned a $25 per square foot base rate were rental properties, which by statute are assessed according to their lowest value under the cost approach, the income approach or the sales comparison approach to value.
To the extent that the Petitioner’s representative argues that its property should not have had an influence factor applied to the land based on the property’s market value, the Petitioner’s representative failed to provide any market evidence of the property’s value. He merely alleged that the county assessor should remove the 100% positive influence factor applied to the Petitioner’s land. Thus, the Petitioner’s representative failed to rebut or impeach the Respondent’s prima facie case that the Petitioner’s property’s land value was not over-assessed for the 2008 assessment year.
For the same reasons, the Board finds that the Petitioner’s representative failed to raise a prima facie case that the Petitioner’s property’s land assessment was over-valued for the 2009 and 2011 assessment years.
The Board applied the new statute for the first time in this case:
