Here, the Petitioner’s representative contends that the subject property was over-valued in 2010 based on the property’s purchase price. Hoppe testimony. According to Mr. Hoppe, the Petitioner purchased the property under appeal on January 9, 2008, for $324,000. Id.; Petitioner Exhibit 2. Mr. Hoppe admitted that a relocation company sold the property for the sellers. Hoppe testimony. However, Mr. Hoppe testified that the sellers were still living in the home at the time of their purchase and there was no relationship between the Petitioner and the sellers of the property. Id.
The purchase price of a property is often the best indication of the property’s value. See Hubler Realty, Inc. v. Hendricks County Assessor, 938 N.E.2d 311, 314 (Ind. Tax Ct. 2010) (the Tax Court upheld the Board’s determination that the weight of the evidence supported the property’s purchase price over its appraised value). While the sale occurred two years prior to the March 1, 2010, assessment date, the Respondent admitted that the county used 2008 and 2009 sales data to establish their 2010 assessments. Moreover, the assessor testified that property values “remained steady” during the relevant time period, which is supported by the property record card which shows that the property’s assessed value fluctuated little from its $345,100 assessed value in 2007, to $346,800 in 2009 and $341,200 in 2010. Thus, the Board finds that the Petitioner’s purchase of the property in 2008 is sufficient to raise a prima facie case that the property was over-valued for the March 1, 2010, assessment date.
Mr. Hoppe also argues that the Petitioner’s purchase price should be further reduced for the 2010 assessment year. Hoppe testimony. In support of this argument, Mr. Hoppe provided articles and graphs which he contends show that the housing market in Boone County declined approximately 10%. Petitioner Exhibit 4. But there is no evidence of the data upon which the authors relied and the authors of the articles were not available to describe their conclusions. While the rules of evidence generally do not apply in the Board’s hearings, the Board requires some evidence of the accuracy and credibility of the evidence. Statements that are unsupported by probative evidence are conclusory and of little value to the Board in making its determination. Whitley Products, Inc. v. State Board of Tax Commissioners, 704 N.E.2d 1113, 1119 (Ind. Tax Ct. 1998); and Herb v. State Board of Tax Commissioners, 656 N.E.2d 890, 893 (Ind. Tax Ct. 1995). Because a reduction in the median or average sale price between years may simply reflect a trend toward lower value homes selling faster than higher value homes, and because the Petitioner’s evidence does not show that its home in particular declined in value during the relevant time period, the Petitioner’s hearsay evidence alone is insufficient to conclude that the Petitioner’s property’s 2010 assessment should be further reduced from its purchase price. Thus, the Board concludes that the Petitioner raised a prima facie case that its property’s 2010 assessment should not exceed its 2008 purchase price of $324,000, but the Petitioner failed to raise a prima facie case that the assessed value of its property should be further reduced.
Once the Petitioner raises a prima facie case that its property was over-valued, the burden shifts to the assessing official to rebut the Petitioner’s evidence. See American United Life Insurance Co. v. Maley, 803 N.E.2d 276 (Ind. Tax Ct. 2004). To rebut or impeach the Petitioner’s case, the Respondent has the same burden to present probative evidence that the Petitioner faced to raise its prima facie case. Fidelity Federal Savings & Loan v. Jennings County Assessor, 836 N.E.2d 1075, 1082 (Ind. Tax Ct. 2005).
Here, the Respondent did not dispute that the Petitioner purchased the property in 2008 for $324,000. Garoffolo testimony; Respondent Exhibit 4. Ms. Garoffolo merely argued that, because the property was bank owned, the sale was “invalid” and cannot be used to establish the subject property’s market value. Garoffolo testimony. Mr. Hoppe, however, testified that it was not a foreclosure or short sale. Hoppe testimony. According to Mr. Hoppe, the Petitioner purchased the property from a relocation company, but that the family was still living in the house at the time of its sale. Id. Moreover, the evidence shows that the property was offered for sale on the Multiple Listing Service for over six months. Respondent Exhibit 4. Thus, even if the property was “bank owned” as the Respondent contends, it was widely marketed for a reasonable period of time. The Respondent presented no evidence that a bank would sell a property for less than its market value and, absent such evidence, the Board will not assume that a property’s sale price reflects anything other than its market value simply because it was “bank owned.”
Ms. Garoffolo also argues the Petitioner’s property was valued correctly in 2010 based on the sale prices of properties located in the subject property’s neighborhood. Garoffolo testimony. In making this argument, the Respondent essentially relies on a sales comparison approach to establish the market value-in-use of the property. See MANUAL at 3 (stating that the sales comparison approach “estimates the total value of the property directly by comparing it to similar, or comparable, properties that have sold in the market.”) In order to effectively use the sales comparison approach as evidence in a property assessment appeal, however, the proponent must establish the comparability of the properties being examined. Conclusory statements that a property is “similar” or “comparable” to another property do not constitute probative evidence of the comparability of the two properties. Long, 821 N.E.2d at 470. Instead, the proponent must identify the characteristics of the subject property and explain how those characteristics compare to the characteristics of the purportedly comparable properties. Id. at 471. Similarly, the proponent must explain how any differences between the properties affect their relative market values-in-use. Id.
Here, the Respondent presented no evidence to show that the properties she offered were comparable to the property under appeal. She merely testified that properties in the Petitioner’s neighborhood sold for prices ranging from $122 per square foot to $160 per square foot in 2008 and 2009. Because the Respondent made no attempt to identify or value the differences between the properties, the Respondent’s sales comparable market analysis has little probative value. As the Indiana Tax Court stated in Fidelity Federal Savings & Loan v. Jennings County Assessor, 836 N.E.2d 1075, 1082 (Ind. Tax Ct. 2005), “the Court has frequently reminded taxpayers that statements that another property ‘is similar’ or ‘is comparable’ are nothing more than conclusions and conclusory statements do not constitute probative evidence. Rather, when challenging an assessment on the basis that the comparable property has been treated differently, the taxpayer must provide specific reasons as to why it believes the property is comparable. These standards are no less applicable to assessing officials.” 836 N.E.2d at 1082 (citations omitted and emphasis added). The Respondent, therefore, failed to rebut or impeach the Petitioner’s evidence that the property was over-valued for the 2010 assessment year.
