The Petitioners purchased property for $310,000 in 2010. Even though they disputed exactly when the sale took place, both parties attempted to rely on that transaction. Regardless of the exact date, nothing in the record indicates the difference between March and May is significant for these purposes. Either date would be sufficiently close to the assessment dates (March 1, 2010, and March 1, 2011) to be probative. Furthermore, the purchase price of a property can be the best evidence of a property‘s value. See Hubler Realty Co. v. Hendricks County Assessor, 938 N.E.2d 311, 315 (Ind. Tax Ct. 2010) (finding that the Board’s determination assigning greater weight to the property’s purchase price than its appraised value was proper and supported by the evidence). The entirety of the evidence in this case, however, makes it unclear what the purchase included: Was the transaction for 1 parcel or 3? Did it include approximately 6.5 acres of classified forest or 16? Because of the ambiguity the parties failed to resolve, the transaction has no probative value for this case.
The Respondent also attempted to compare sales of five homes that occurred during the period 2009 through 2011 in the same subdivision as the subject property. To properly use a sales comparison approach, the analysis needed to identify the characteristics of the subject property, establish how its characteristics compared to those of the purportedly comparable properties, and establish how any differences affected the relevant market value-in-use of the properties. Long v. Wayne Township Assessor, 821 N.E.2d 466, 471 (Ind. Tax Ct. 2005).
In this case, the Respondent offered a comparison grid that purports to satisfy the requirements explained in Long. The Respondent supplied MLS sheets for the comparables and used that data to compare various features of the properties. Where there were differences, the Respondent applied adjustments to the comparables to account for them. On the surface, the Respondent’s comparison grid resembles the kind of thing appraisers commonly do, but there is no indication that an appraiser did this work. Therefore, the confidence that comes from the work of a licensed appraiser who certified he or she conformed to USPAP standards is lacking in the Respondent’s sales comparison approach. Furthermore, a significant weakness with the Respondent’s evidence is that the amounts of the “adjustments” for the differences between the subject property and the comparables—in every instance the adjustments were huge.4 But the Respondent offered no meaningful evidence or explanation for how the amounts were determined. Furthermore, the adjusted sale prices range from $337,000 down to $258,100. Both of the appealed assessments fall around the middle of that very big range—a point to which the Respondent attached some significance. While this kind of evidence might be sufficient to show a valuation is within an acceptable range for mass appraisal purposes, the Respondent did not establish that it proves the actual value of the subject property. The Respondent’s attempt at a sales comparison approach does not prove the assessed value of the subject property is correct.
The Respondent did not make a prima facie case that the 2010 assessed value is correct. Consequently, the Petitioners are entitled to a reduction back to what the assessment was for 2009, i.e. $236,200.
Next we turn to whether the Petitioners made a prima facie case for the 2011 assessment.
The Petitioners argued that they were penalized because their purchase of the property triggered an inspection by local assessing officials. According to the Petitioners, the assessments of other properties in the neighborhood declined by 8% and theirs increased. Even if this point is true, this argument fails to establish the current assessment of the subject property does not accurately reflect its market value-in-use.
The Petitioners identified several purported inaccuracies on their property record card. But even if they are correct about the second structure they refer to as a shop, the porches, and the lack of a kitchen in the basement of the main residence, the Petitioners failed to prove their case by simply focusing on the methodology used to compute the assessment. Eckerling v. Wayne Twp. Assessor, 841 N.E.2d 674, 677 (Ind. Tax Ct. 2006). To successfully make their case they needed to show the assessment does not accurately reflect the property’s market value-in-use. Id.; see also P/A Builders & Developers, LLC v. Jennings County Assessor, 842 N.E.2d 899, 900 (Ind. Tax Ct. 2006) (explaining that the proper focus is not on methodology, but rather on what the correct value actually is). Again, even if this point is true, it fails to establish the current assessment of the subject property does not accurately reflect market value-in-use.
The most effective method to establish value can be through the presentation of a market value-in-use appraisal, completed in conformance with the Uniform Standards of Professional Appraisal Practice. Kooshtard Property VI, LLC v. White River Twp. Assessor, 836 N.E.2d 501, 506 n. 6 (Ind. Tax Ct. 2005). The Petitioners presented an appraisal that indicates the value of the property was $260,000. The appraised date and the assessment date are only a few weeks apart. The appraisal is sufficient to establish a prima facie case for an assessment of no more than $260,000 as of March 1, 2011.
But the Petitioners seek an even lower assessment based on removing the value of classified forest land. Conceptually they may be correct. At the very least it seems clear that the appraisal includes too much land (almost 9 acres too much). The problem is the proper amount for such an adjustment. The Petitioners proposed to reduce the appraised value by approximately $65,000 because the appraiser valued their land at $4,000 per acre and their 16.24 acres of classified forest have only nominal value for assessment purposes. The appraisal does not mention classified forest land at all. While the appraiser used $4,000 per acre for residential land value, nothing in the appraisal supports the assumption that classified forest land has the same value. Accordingly, the Petitioners’ conclusory assumption about land value and their calculation to manipulate the appraised value based on that assumption are not probative evidence.
Apart from the appraisal, the Petitioners tried to rely on their own separate sales comparison evidence to show the market value of their property. But in order to effectively use the sales comparison approach, the proponent must establish the comparability of the properties being examined. Conclusory statements that a property is “similar” or “comparable” to another property do not constitute probative evidence of the comparability of the properties. Long, 821 N.E.2d at 470. Instead, the party seeking to rely on a sales comparison approach must explain the characteristics of the subject property and how those characteristics compare to those of purportedly comparable properties. See Id. at 470-71. They must explain how any differences between the properties affect their relative market value-in-use. The Petitioners offered some details about the kinds of features the various properties have, but their value comparisons and conclusions were not sufficiently supported or explained. Consequently, this part of the Petitioners’ evidence also falls far short of what is required for any legitimate conclusion of value for the subject property based on comparative sales.
For the 2011 assessment, the Respondent failed to rebut or impeach the credibility of the appraisal. In spite of its problems, that valuation of $260,000 stands as the most credible evidence of the market value-in-use of the subject property for 2011.
