The Petitioner first contends that the assessed value of his property was too high in 2007 based on his purchase of the property for $8,225 in 1990. Shults testimony; Petitioner Exhibit A. The sale of the subject property is often the best evidence of the property’s value. See Hubler Realty Co. v. Hendricks County Assessor, 938 N.E.2d 311, 315 (Ind. Tax Ct. 2010) (finding that the Board’s determination assigning greater weight to the property’s purchase price than its appraised value was proper and supported by the evidence). The Petitioner, however, bought the subject property sixteen years prior to the relevant January 1, 2006, valuation date. Thus, his purchase of the property is too remote from that valuation date for his purchase price to be probative of the property’s true tax value. Mr. Shults attempts to relate his purchase price to the relevant valuation date by arguing that property values were higher in 1990 in his neighborhood than they were in 2007, but he offered no evidence to substantiate that opinion. Statements that are unsupported by probative evidence are conclusory and of little value to the Board in making its determination. Whitley Products, Inc. v. State Board of Tax Commissioners, 704 N.E.2d 1113, 1119 (Ind. Tax Ct. 1998).
The Petitioner also contends that the value of his property was over-stated based on a broker’s opinion of value that estimated the property’s value to be $13,000. Shults testimony; Petitioner Exhibit C. Although the opinion of value was undated, the “comparable” sales were from November and December of 2008 and the attached MLS listings were printed on January 30, 2009, and February 2, 2009. Thus, the evidence suggestions that Mr. Griffin valued the Petitioner’s property as of February of 2009, which is three years after the valuation date. Also, his opinion of value did not state whether Mr. Griffin used generally accepted appraisal methods to arrive at his opinion of market value. Consequently, his estimate of the Petitioner’s property’s market value is not probative of the property’s market value-in-use. See Inland Steel Co. v. State Board of Tax Commissioners, 739 N.201,220 (Ind. Tax Ct. 2000) (holding that an appraiser’s opinion lacked probative value where the appraiser failed to explain what a producer price index was, how it was calculated or that its use as a deflator was a generally accepted appraisal technique). Likewise, the list of sales in 2007 attached to Petitioner’s Exhibit C also has little probative value given the January 1, 2006, valuation date for the March 1, 2007, assessment.2 Moreover, there is no indication of who compiled the report or how the sales were selected. While the rules of evidence generally do not apply in the Board’s hearings, the Board requires some proof of the accuracy and credibility of the evidence.
Similarly, the Petitioner contends that his property was over-valued based on the sale of a neighboring property for $6,000 in July 2012. But again, this sale took place more than six years after the relevant valuation date and is not probative of the value of the subject property on January 1, 2006.
Finally, the Petitioner argues that his property’s value increased from $3,030 in 1989 to a high of $64,000, even though market values of properties in the area have decreased. However, evidence as to a property’s assessment in one tax year is not probative of its true tax value in a different tax year. Fleet Supply, Inc. v. State Bd. of Tax Comm’rs, 747 N.E.2d 645, 650 (Ind. Tax Ct. 2001) (citing Glass Wholesalers, Inc. v. State Bd. of Tax Comm’rs, 568 N.E.2d 1116, 1124 (Ind. Tax Ct. 1991)) (“Finally, the Court reminds Fleet Supply that each assessment and each tax year stands alone. … Thus, evidence as to the Main Building's assessment in 1992 is not probative as to its assessed value three years later.”) Consequently, what the assessment was for the Petitioner’s property in prior years has little relevance or probative value in determining the property’s 2007 assessment.
To the extent that the Petitioner contends his due process rights were denied by the PTABOA, those contentions are largely irrelevant because the Board’s proceedings are de novo. While the Board sympathizes with Mr. Shults’ frustration, the Board does not review a county assessor’s or PTABOA’s determination for an abuse of discretion. Mr. Shults needed to offer probative evidence that his property’s assessment did not accurately reflect its market value-in-use for the 2007 assessment year. This he failed to do.
