The Holmeses first pointed to the
sales of two properties that Mr. Holmes described as comparable to the subject
property. For sales data to be probative, however, the properties that sold
must be sufficiently comparable to the property under appeal. Conclusory
statements that a property is “similar” or “comparable” to another property do
not suffice; instead, one must identify the characteristics of the property
under appeal and explain how those characteristics compare to the
characteristics of the properties that sold. Long v. Wayne Twp. Assessor, 821
N.E.2d 466, 470-71 (Ind. Tax Ct. 2005). Similarly, one must explain how any
differences between the sold properties and the property under appeal affect
their relative market values-in-use. Id.
Mr. Holmes offered general
comparisons between the subject home and the two homes that sold in terms of a
few relevant characteristics. But he ignored many others. And he failed to
explain how relevant differences affected the properties’ relative market
values-in-use. Even if Mr. Holmes had done a less superficial comparison, he
did not explain how a sale from October 2005 related to the subject property’s
market value-in-use as of the relevant valuation dates of January 1, 2007 and
January 1, 2008. At most, he pointed to properties that sold for lower prices
in 2010 and 2011 than they had earlier and asserted that property values were
declining. But those sales do little to show when any market decline occurred.
For example, property values could have been higher on the relevant valuation
dates (January 1, 2007 and 2008) than they were in 2005, with all of the
depreciation occurring in later years.
Mr. Holmes also claimed that
the properties Mr. Potts characterized as being comparable to the subject
property were actually assessed for less than the subject property. That is only
partially true. 518 S. Bluff’s assessment (as determined by the PTABOA) was lower
than the subject property’s assessment (as determined by the PTABOA) for both years,
albeit only marginally. But the other two properties—206 S. Bluff and 546 S. Main—were
actually assessed for more than the subject property (as determined by the PTABOA)
in both years. Regardless, neither Mr. Potts nor Mr. Holmes explained how any
relevant differences between those three properties and the subject property
affected their relative market values-in-use. Thus, Mr. Holmes’s assessment
comparison, like his sales comparison, lacks probative value.
Finally, Mr. Holmes claimed
that assessments from the subject property’s neighborhood were poor predictors
of sale prices, pointing to three properties that sold for prices above their
assessments and two properties that sold below their assessments. The fact that
some properties sold for prices different than what they were assessed for,
however, does nothing to show the subject property’s market value-in-use. At
most, the Holmeses’ evidence about sales-to-assessment ratios might relate to a
claim for an equalization adjustment based on a lack of uniformity and equality
in assessments. See Indiana Dep’t of Local Gov. Fin. v. Commonwealth Edison
Co. 820 N.E.2d 1222 (Ind. 2005) (“Commonwealth was entitled to seek an
adjustment to the assessed value of its distributable property . . . on grounds
that its property taxes were higher than they would have been had other
property in Lake County been property assessed.”). But the Holmeses did not
make such a claim, and even if they did, their evidence would fall well short
of proving an actionable lack of uniformity and equality or their entitlement
to an equalization adjustment. Indeed, because the Holmeses did not offer
probative evidence to establish the subject property’s market value-in-use, one
cannot tell whether the property was assessed above or below the common level.
