Mr. Costello spent much of his
time arguing that the PTABOA was not properly constituted when it heard and
decided the appeal below. But that claim is irrelevant to the Costellos’ appeal
before the Board. The Board’s proceedings are de novo, and nothing about
how the PTABOA was constituted hindered the Costellos from presenting their
valuation case to the Board. Indeed, it is not clear what relief the Costellos
seek. At most, a finding that the PTABOA was not properly constituted might
lead the Board to dismiss the Costellos’ Form 131 petition and remand the matter
for a properly constituted PTABOA to hear and decide the appeal. Such a finding,
however, would not be grounds for reducing the subject property’s assessment.
If anything, because the improperly constituted PTABOA’s determination would be
a nullity, the assessment would be returned to the higher amount originally
determined by the Assessor.
The Board therefore turns to
the Costellos’ claims about the subject property’s assessment... The Costellos challenged both
the land portion of the subject property’s assessment and the property’s
overall assessment. As to the land assessment, the Costellos pointed first to
the Board’s final determination in their appeal of the subject property’s March
1, 2007 assessment. In that determination the Board found that the Assessor had
admitted to an error in the property’s land assessment and reduced the assessment
accordingly. Evidence of a property’s assessment in one year, however, is not
necessarily probative of its true tax value in another year. E.g., Fleet
Supply, Inc. v. State Bd. of Tax Comm’rs, 747 N.E.2d 645, 650 (Ind. Tax Ct.
2001) (citing Glass Wholesalers, Inc. v. State Bd. of Tax Comm’rs, 568
N.E.2d 1116, 1124 (Ind. Tax Ct. 1991)) (“Finally, the Court reminds Fleet Supply
that each assessment and each tax year stands alone. . . . Thus, evidence as to
the Main Building's assessment in 1992 is not probative as to its assessed
value three years later.”). That is particularly true here, where the final
determination that the Costellos rely on was for an assessment date four years
before the assessment at issue in this appeal.
Mr. Costello also pointed to
the land assessments for three nearby “60-foot” lots. Costello testimony.
Those March 1, 2011 assessments ranged from $124,000 to $165,000. Without
anything else, that range does as much to support the PTABOA’s determination of
$148,000 for the subject land as it does to rebut that determination. In any
case, Mr. Costello did not attempt to compare the three neighboring lots to the
subject lot other than to highlight their proximity to each other and the fact
that they are all “60-foot” lots. Mr. Costello’s comparative assessment data
therefore has little or no probative value. See Long v. Wayne Twp. Assessor,
821 N.E.2d 466, 471 (Ind. Tax Ct. 2005) (finding that sales data lacked
probative value where taxpayers did not compare the characteristics of the
subject property and to those of the sold properties or explain how differences
affected the properties’ relative market values-in-use).
As to the Property’s overall
assessment, Mr. Costello pointed to the assessments, and in some cases to the
sale prices, for the three neighboring properties as well as for various other
properties around Sylvan Lake. Again, Mr. Costello did little to show how those
properties compared to the subject or property or to account for any relevant
ways in which the properties differed. So the assessment and sales data lacks probative
weight for purposes of showing the subject property’s overall market value-in-use.
But Mr. Costello also pointed
to the assessment and sales data to make two more general points: (1) that
assessments around Sylvan Lake varied significantly from year to year with
little rhyme or reason, and (2) that real estate prices were down across the
board. As to Mr. Costello’s first point, the fact that assessment values fluctuated
annually does little to show that the subject property’s March 1, 2011 assessment
was wrong or, if so, what the correct assessment should have been. As explained
above, evidence of a property’s assessment in one year is not necessarily probative
of its true tax value in another year.
As to Mr. Costello’s second
point, the fact that some properties sold for less than what they were assessed
for does little to prove that real estate values were down or, more
importantly, what the subject property’s market value-in-use was. At most, the Costellos’
evidence about sales to assessment ratios might relate a claim for an equalization
adjustment based on a lack of uniformity and equality in assessments. See
Indiana Dep’t of Local Gov. Fin. v. Commonwealth Edison Co. 820 N.E.2d 1222
(Ind. 2005) (“Commonwealth was entitled to seek an adjustment to the assessed
value of its distributable property . . . on grounds that its property taxes
were higher than they would have been had other property in Lake County been
property assessed). But the Costellos did not make such a claim, and even if
they did, their evidence would fall well short of proving an actionable lack of
uniformity and equality.
Finally, the Costellos offered
evidence to show that weeds were present in various areas of Sylvan Lake. While
having a weed problem might affect the subject property’s value, merely showing
that a problem exists is not enough; the Costellos instead needed to offer
probative evidence to show the degree to which any weed problem affected the
property’s market value-in-use. Because the Costellos did not offer such
evidence, the fact that Sylvan Lake has a weed problem does little to rebut the
subject property’s assessment.
