b) The Martins point to the
condition of the cottage and to the subject parcels’ shallow mucky waterfronts,
which are not conducive to swimming or docking boats. They also point to a
portion of Lot 2 being marshy wetlands, which according to Mr. Martin, make the
lot useful only as a buffer. Although those facts are relevant to determining
the parcels’ market values-in-use, they do not, by themselves, quantify a value
or range of values for the parcels.
c) For that, the Martins rely on
Ms. Dumford’s appraisals. Ms. Dumford is an Indiana general certified appraiser
who certified that she performed her appraisals in conformity with USPAP. She
used a generally accepted methodology—the sales comparison approach—to arrive
at her valuation opinions. And she estimated each lot’s value as of April 2,
2010—less than a month after the relevant valuation date for the assessment
under appeal. Thus, at first blush, Ms. Dumford’s appraisals are generally
probative of the subject parcels’ market values-in-use, and they make a prima
facie case for changing the parcels’ assessments.
d) But the Assessor effectively
impeached Ms. Dumford’s valuation opinions by pointing to the enormous,
unexplained adjustments to her comparable properties’ sale prices. Ms. Dumford
adjusted those sale prices by as much as 68% to account for differences between
the comparable properties and the subject parcels in terms of their relative
sizes and “clearing,”2 and by 30% to account for time-related differences in
market conditions. In the most extreme case (Lot 2), that led Ms. Dumford to
adjust sale prices that ranged from $28.18 to $87.90 per square foot down to a
range of $2.03 to $2.82 per square foot. Ms. Dumford’s appraisals say nothing
about how she quantified those adjustments or why, given the adjustments’
enormous sizes, the properties should even be considered comparable to the
subject parcels. Similarly, she largely ignored the cottage on Lot 4 based on
her conclusory assertion that, given the cottage’s age, it did not contribute
anything to the site’s value. And Ms. Dumford did not appear at the hearing to
testify on any of those points.
e) We recognize that appraisers
necessarily exercise discretion in selecting properties to use in a
sales-comparison analysis and in determining adjustments to sale prices. Ms.
Dumford may have had good reasons for selecting the properties that she used.
But given the enormity of her adjustments and the lack of any explanation, we
cannot simply assume that she applied generally accepted appraisal principles.
Under those circumstances, we find Ms. Dumford’s appraisals too unreliable to
establish the market value-in-use for any of the subject parcels.
f) Because Ms. Dumford’s
valuation opinions do not carry probative weight, and because the Martins’
other evidence about the parcels does not establish a value, or even a likely
range of values, for the subject parcels, the Martins failed to meet their
burden of proof.
